Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending

We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors’ contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders’ common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Up...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sutherland, Andrew Gordon
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press (OUP) 2021
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130400
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author Sutherland, Andrew Gordon
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Sutherland, Andrew Gordon
author_sort Sutherland, Andrew Gordon
collection MIT
description We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors’ contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders’ common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Upon entering, lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others offer. This reaction is mediated by the distribution of market shares: lenders with higher shares or that operate in concentrated markets react less. Thus, contract terms are shaped not only by borrower or lender fundamentals but also by the interaction between information availability and competition.
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spelling mit-1721.1/1304002021-04-08T03:27:00Z Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending Sutherland, Andrew Gordon Sloan School of Management We study how small and medium enterprise (SME) lenders react to information about their competitors’ contracting decisions. To isolate this learning from lenders’ common reactions to unobserved shocks to fundamentals, we exploit the staggered entry of lenders into an information-sharing platform. Upon entering, lenders adjust their contract terms toward what others offer. This reaction is mediated by the distribution of market shares: lenders with higher shares or that operate in concentrated markets react less. Thus, contract terms are shaped not only by borrower or lender fundamentals but also by the interaction between information availability and competition. 2021-04-07T13:52:36Z 2021-04-07T13:52:36Z 2020-05 2021-04-07T12:30:38Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0893-9454 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130400 Darmouni, Olivier and Andrew Sutherland. “Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending.” Review of Financial Studies (May 2020) © 2020 The Author(s) en 10.1093/RFS/HHAA109 Review of Financial Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press (OUP) SSRN
spellingShingle Sutherland, Andrew Gordon
Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending
title Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending
title_full Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending
title_fullStr Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending
title_full_unstemmed Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending
title_short Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending
title_sort learning about competitors evidence from sme lending
url https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130400
work_keys_str_mv AT sutherlandandrewgordon learningaboutcompetitorsevidencefromsmelending