A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots
As airport arrival capacities increasingly constrain the air transportation system, there is a need for mechanisms by which airlines can exchange landing slots amongst each other. We analyze two such mechanisms, scaled airline preferences and two-for-two trades, from a game-theoretic perspective. Th...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130428 |
| _version_ | 1826203636199325696 |
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| author | Baek, Jackie Balakrishnan, Hamsa Baek, Jackie |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center Baek, Jackie Balakrishnan, Hamsa Baek, Jackie |
| author_sort | Baek, Jackie |
| collection | MIT |
| description | As airport arrival capacities increasingly constrain the air transportation system, there is a need for mechanisms by which airlines can exchange landing slots amongst each other. We analyze two such mechanisms, scaled airline preferences and two-for-two trades, from a game-theoretic perspective. This paper investigates the extent to which strategic behavior on part of the airlines can impact the performance of each mechanism. In addition to increasing system efficiency, the reallocation mechanisms should exhibit desirable fairness and incentive properties, notions that we formally investigate in this paper. We show that neither mechanism has good incentive properties, and we develop simple, non-truthful strategies that airlines can use. Our empirical results show that for the scaled airline preferences mechanism, the best performing strategy depends greatly on the extent to which fairness is enforced. For the two-for-two trades mechanism, a simple threshold strategy can yield significant cost savings relative to the best-response strategy, and system efficiency increases when all airlines use the threshold strategy in equilibrium. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:40:59Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/130428 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:40:59Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1304282022-10-01T10:27:54Z A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots Baek, Jackie Balakrishnan, Hamsa Baek, Jackie Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Operations Research Center Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics As airport arrival capacities increasingly constrain the air transportation system, there is a need for mechanisms by which airlines can exchange landing slots amongst each other. We analyze two such mechanisms, scaled airline preferences and two-for-two trades, from a game-theoretic perspective. This paper investigates the extent to which strategic behavior on part of the airlines can impact the performance of each mechanism. In addition to increasing system efficiency, the reallocation mechanisms should exhibit desirable fairness and incentive properties, notions that we formally investigate in this paper. We show that neither mechanism has good incentive properties, and we develop simple, non-truthful strategies that airlines can use. Our empirical results show that for the scaled airline preferences mechanism, the best performing strategy depends greatly on the extent to which fairness is enforced. For the two-for-two trades mechanism, a simple threshold strategy can yield significant cost savings relative to the best-response strategy, and system efficiency increases when all airlines use the threshold strategy in equilibrium. NSF (Grants 1239054 and 1739505) 2021-04-09T18:07:33Z 2021-04-09T18:07:33Z 2020-09 2021-04-07T16:38:16Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1524-9050 1558-0016 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130428 Baek, Jackie and Hamsa Balakrishnan. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots." IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems 21, 9 (September 2020): 3909 - 3922 © 2020 IEEE en http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tits.2019.2938669 IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Baek, Jackie Balakrishnan, Hamsa Baek, Jackie A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots |
| title | A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots |
| title_full | A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots |
| title_fullStr | A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots |
| title_short | A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Reallocation Mechanisms for Airport Landing Slots |
| title_sort | game theoretic analysis of reallocation mechanisms for airport landing slots |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130428 |
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