Common belief foundations of global games
© 2016 Elsevier Inc.. We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, define...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier BV
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/134269 |
| _version_ | 1811082015845384192 |
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| author | Morris, Stephen Shin, Hyun Song Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Morris, Stephen Shin, Hyun Song Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author_sort | Morris, Stephen |
| collection | MIT |
| description | © 2016 Elsevier Inc.. We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'. We argue that this is the driving force behind selection results for the specific type spaces in the global games literature. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:56:02Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/134269 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:56:02Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Elsevier BV |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1342692023-11-08T21:46:30Z Common belief foundations of global games Morris, Stephen Shin, Hyun Song Yildiz, Muhamet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics © 2016 Elsevier Inc.. We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'. We argue that this is the driving force behind selection results for the specific type spaces in the global games literature. 2021-10-27T20:04:15Z 2021-10-27T20:04:15Z 2016 2019-09-18T13:02:12Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/134269 Morris, S., H. S. Shin, and M. Yildiz. "Common Belief Foundations of Global Games." Journal of Economic Theory 163 (2016): 826-48. en 10.1016/J.JET.2016.03.007 Journal of Economic Theory Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Elsevier BV other univ website |
| spellingShingle | Morris, Stephen Shin, Hyun Song Yildiz, Muhamet Common belief foundations of global games |
| title | Common belief foundations of global games |
| title_full | Common belief foundations of global games |
| title_fullStr | Common belief foundations of global games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Common belief foundations of global games |
| title_short | Common belief foundations of global games |
| title_sort | common belief foundations of global games |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/134269 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT morrisstephen commonbelieffoundationsofglobalgames AT shinhyunsong commonbelieffoundationsofglobalgames AT yildizmuhamet commonbelieffoundationsofglobalgames |