Common belief foundations of global games
© 2016 Elsevier Inc.. We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, define...
Main Authors: | Morris, Stephen, Shin, Hyun Song, Yildiz, Muhamet |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier BV
2021
|
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/134269 |
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