Collusion by Algorithm: Does Better Demand Prediction Facilitate Coordination Between Sellers?
© 2019 INFORMS. We build a game-theoretic model to examine how better demand forecasting resulting from algorithms, machine learning, and artificial intelligence affects the sustainability of collusion in an industry. We find that, although better forecasting allows colluding firms to better tailor...
Main Authors: | Miklós-Thal, Jeanine, Tucker, Catherine |
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Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
2021
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/134402 |
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