Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Political districts may be drawn to favor one group or political party over another, or <jats:italic>gerrymandered</jats:italic>. A number of measurements have been suggested as ways to detect and prevent such behavior. These mea...

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Main Authors: Barnes, Richard, Solomon, Justin
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press (CUP) 2021
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135571
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author Barnes, Richard
Solomon, Justin
author2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
author_facet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Barnes, Richard
Solomon, Justin
author_sort Barnes, Richard
collection MIT
description <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Political districts may be drawn to favor one group or political party over another, or <jats:italic>gerrymandered</jats:italic>. A number of measurements have been suggested as ways to detect and prevent such behavior. These measures give concrete axes along which districts and districting plans can be compared. However, measurement values are affected by both noise and the compounding effects of seemingly innocuous implementation decisions. Such issues will arise for any measure. As a case study demonstrating the effect, we show that commonly used measures of geometric compactness for district boundaries are affected by several factors irrelevant to fairness or compliance with civil rights law. We further show that an adversary could manipulate measurements to affect the assessment of a given plan. This instability complicates using these measurements as legislative or judicial standards to counteract unfair redistricting practices. This paper accompanies the release of packages in C++, Python, and R that correctly, efficiently, and reproducibly calculate a variety of compactness scores.</jats:p>
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spelling mit-1721.1/1355712023-03-15T20:10:40Z Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse Barnes, Richard Solomon, Justin Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Political districts may be drawn to favor one group or political party over another, or <jats:italic>gerrymandered</jats:italic>. A number of measurements have been suggested as ways to detect and prevent such behavior. These measures give concrete axes along which districts and districting plans can be compared. However, measurement values are affected by both noise and the compounding effects of seemingly innocuous implementation decisions. Such issues will arise for any measure. As a case study demonstrating the effect, we show that commonly used measures of geometric compactness for district boundaries are affected by several factors irrelevant to fairness or compliance with civil rights law. We further show that an adversary could manipulate measurements to affect the assessment of a given plan. This instability complicates using these measurements as legislative or judicial standards to counteract unfair redistricting practices. This paper accompanies the release of packages in C++, Python, and R that correctly, efficiently, and reproducibly calculate a variety of compactness scores.</jats:p> 2021-10-27T20:24:04Z 2021-10-27T20:24:04Z 2020 2021-01-26T18:25:05Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135571 en 10.1017/pan.2020.36 Political Analysis Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Cambridge University Press (CUP) arXiv
spellingShingle Barnes, Richard
Solomon, Justin
Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
title Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
title_full Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
title_fullStr Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
title_full_unstemmed Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
title_short Gerrymandering and Compactness: Implementation Flexibility and Abuse
title_sort gerrymandering and compactness implementation flexibility and abuse
url https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135571
work_keys_str_mv AT barnesrichard gerrymanderingandcompactnessimplementationflexibilityandabuse
AT solomonjustin gerrymanderingandcompactnessimplementationflexibilityandabuse