Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation
An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press (OUP)
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135822 |
| _version_ | 1811077405293412352 |
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| author | Awad, Edmond Caminada, Martin WA Pigozzi, Gabriella Podlaszewski, Mikołaj Rahwan, Iyad |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Media Laboratory |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Media Laboratory Awad, Edmond Caminada, Martin WA Pigozzi, Gabriella Podlaszewski, Mikołaj Rahwan, Iyad |
| author_sort | Awad, Edmond |
| collection | MIT |
| description | An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a
defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to
evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the
problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of
arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the
outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social
optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have
their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current
paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation
operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under
different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental
trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand,
and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further
investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation
theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation
operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the
nature of agents' preferences. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:42:30Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/135822 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:42:30Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1358222023-12-14T15:28:18Z Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation Awad, Edmond Caminada, Martin WA Pigozzi, Gabriella Podlaszewski, Mikołaj Rahwan, Iyad Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Media Laboratory An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of aggregating the opinions of multiple agents on how a given set of arguments should be evaluated. It is crucial not only to ensure that the outcome is logically consistent, but also satisfies measures of social optimality and immunity to strategic manipulation. This is because agents have their individual preferences about what the outcome ought to be. In the current paper, we analyze three previously introduced argument-based aggregation operators with respect to Pareto optimality and strategy proofness under different general classes of agent preferences. We highlight fundamental trade-offs between strategic manipulability and social optimality on one hand, and classical logical criteria on the other. Our results motivate further investigation into the relationship between social choice and argumentation theory. The results are also relevant for choosing an appropriate aggregation operator given the criteria that are considered more important, as well as the nature of agents' preferences. 2021-10-27T20:29:29Z 2021-10-27T20:29:29Z 2017 2019-07-25T15:03:55Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135822 en 10.1093/LOGCOM/EXX017 Journal of Logic and Computation Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press (OUP) arXiv |
| spellingShingle | Awad, Edmond Caminada, Martin WA Pigozzi, Gabriella Podlaszewski, Mikołaj Rahwan, Iyad Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation |
| title | Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation |
| title_full | Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation |
| title_fullStr | Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation |
| title_short | Pareto optimality and strategy-proofness in group argument evaluation |
| title_sort | pareto optimality and strategy proofness in group argument evaluation |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/135822 |
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