Social Learning Equilibria
© 2020 The Econometric Society We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We introduce social learning equilibria,...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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The Econometric Society
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136019 |
| _version_ | 1826212027742289920 |
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| author | Mossel, Elchanan Mueller-Frank, Manuel Sly, Allan Tamuz, Omer |
| author2 | Statistics and Data Science Center (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) |
| author_facet | Statistics and Data Science Center (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Mossel, Elchanan Mueller-Frank, Manuel Sly, Allan Tamuz, Omer |
| author_sort | Mossel, Elchanan |
| collection | MIT |
| description | © 2020 The Econometric Society We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We introduce social learning equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given extensive form, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish general conditions for agreement, herding, and information aggregation in equilibrium, highlighting a connection between agreement and information aggregation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:15:18Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/136019 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:15:18Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | The Econometric Society |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1360192023-10-06T20:06:01Z Social Learning Equilibria Mossel, Elchanan Mueller-Frank, Manuel Sly, Allan Tamuz, Omer Statistics and Data Science Center (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics © 2020 The Econometric Society We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We introduce social learning equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given extensive form, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equilibrium behavior. We establish general conditions for agreement, herding, and information aggregation in equilibrium, highlighting a connection between agreement and information aggregation. 2021-10-27T20:30:26Z 2021-10-27T20:30:26Z 2020 2021-05-25T12:39:29Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136019 en 10.3982/ECTA16465 Econometrica Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf The Econometric Society arXiv |
| spellingShingle | Mossel, Elchanan Mueller-Frank, Manuel Sly, Allan Tamuz, Omer Social Learning Equilibria |
| title | Social Learning Equilibria |
| title_full | Social Learning Equilibria |
| title_fullStr | Social Learning Equilibria |
| title_full_unstemmed | Social Learning Equilibria |
| title_short | Social Learning Equilibria |
| title_sort | social learning equilibria |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136019 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT mosselelchanan sociallearningequilibria AT muellerfrankmanuel sociallearningequilibria AT slyallan sociallearningequilibria AT tamuzomer sociallearningequilibria |