Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership

© 2019 Elsevier B.V. This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms...

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Main Authors: Park, Jihwon, Sani, Jalal, Shroff, Nemit, White, Hal
Other Authors: Sloan School of Management
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier BV 2021
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136172
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author Park, Jihwon
Sani, Jalal
Shroff, Nemit
White, Hal
author2 Sloan School of Management
author_facet Sloan School of Management
Park, Jihwon
Sani, Jalal
Shroff, Nemit
White, Hal
author_sort Park, Jihwon
collection MIT
description © 2019 Elsevier B.V. This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity.
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spelling mit-1721.1/1361722023-12-13T15:03:15Z Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership Park, Jihwon Sani, Jalal Shroff, Nemit White, Hal Sloan School of Management © 2019 Elsevier B.V. This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms to “internalize” the externality benefits of their disclosure for co-owned peer firms. Accordingly, we find a positive relation between common ownership and disclosure. Evidence from cross-sectional tests and a quasi-natural experiment based on financial institution mergers help mitigate concerns that our results are explained by an omitted variable bias or reverse causality. Finally, we find that common ownership is associated with increased market liquidity. 2021-10-27T20:34:05Z 2021-10-27T20:34:05Z 2019 2021-04-14T12:59:38Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136172 en 10.1016/J.JACCECO.2019.02.001 Journal of Accounting and Economics Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ application/pdf Elsevier BV SSRN
spellingShingle Park, Jihwon
Sani, Jalal
Shroff, Nemit
White, Hal
Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
title Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
title_full Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
title_fullStr Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
title_full_unstemmed Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
title_short Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
title_sort disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
url https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136172
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