Disclosure incentives when competing firms have common ownership
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. This paper examines whether common ownership – i.e., instances where investors simultaneously own significant stakes in competing firms – affects voluntary disclosure. We argue that common ownership (i) reduces proprietary cost concerns of disclosure, and (ii) incentivizes firms...
Main Authors: | Park, Jihwon, Sani, Jalal, Shroff, Nemit, White, Hal |
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Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Elsevier BV
2021
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136172 |
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