Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity
© 2019 American Economic Association. We estimate the extent of defensive medicine by physicians, embracing the no- liability counterfactual made possible by the structure of liability rules in the Military Health System. Active- duty patients seeking treatment from military facilities cannot sue fo...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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American Economic Association
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136408 |
| _version_ | 1811087982408499200 |
|---|---|
| author | Frakes, Michael Gruber, Jonathan |
| author_facet | Frakes, Michael Gruber, Jonathan |
| author_sort | Frakes, Michael |
| collection | MIT |
| description | © 2019 American Economic Association. We estimate the extent of defensive medicine by physicians, embracing the no- liability counterfactual made possible by the structure of liability rules in the Military Health System. Active- duty patients seeking treatment from military facilities cannot sue for harms resulting from negligent care, while protections are provided to dependents treated at military facilities and to all patients-active duty or not-that receive care from civilian facilities. Drawing on this variation and exploiting exogenous shocks to care location choices stemming from base- hospital closures, we find suggestive evidence that liability immunity reduces inpatient spending by 5 percent with no measurable negative effect on patient outcomes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:54:40Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/136408 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:54:40Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1364082022-03-30T14:32:48Z Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity Frakes, Michael Gruber, Jonathan © 2019 American Economic Association. We estimate the extent of defensive medicine by physicians, embracing the no- liability counterfactual made possible by the structure of liability rules in the Military Health System. Active- duty patients seeking treatment from military facilities cannot sue for harms resulting from negligent care, while protections are provided to dependents treated at military facilities and to all patients-active duty or not-that receive care from civilian facilities. Drawing on this variation and exploiting exogenous shocks to care location choices stemming from base- hospital closures, we find suggestive evidence that liability immunity reduces inpatient spending by 5 percent with no measurable negative effect on patient outcomes. 2021-10-27T20:35:13Z 2021-10-27T20:35:13Z 2019 2019-10-23T12:25:30Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136408 en 10.1257/pol.20180167 AEJ: Economic Policy Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Frakes, Michael Gruber, Jonathan Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity |
| title | Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity |
| title_full | Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity |
| title_fullStr | Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity |
| title_short | Defensive Medicine: Evidence from Military Immunity |
| title_sort | defensive medicine evidence from military immunity |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/136408 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT frakesmichael defensivemedicineevidencefrommilitaryimmunity AT gruberjonathan defensivemedicineevidencefrommilitaryimmunity |