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1826193293594066944
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MIT
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© Thibaut Horel, Sunoo Park, Silas Richelson, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. In this work, we examine the feasibility of secure and undetectable point-to-point communication when an adversary (e.g., a government) can read all encrypted communications of surveillance targets. We consider a model where the only permitted method of communication is via a government-mandated encryption scheme, instantiated with government-mandated keys. Parties cannot simply encrypt ciphertexts of some other encryption scheme, because citizens caught trying to communicate outside the government’s knowledge (e.g., by encrypting strings which do not appear to be natural language plaintexts) will be arrested. The one guarantee we suppose is that the government mandates an encryption scheme which is semantically secure against outsiders: a perhaps reasonable supposition when a government might consider it advantageous to secure its people’s communication against foreign entities. But then, what good is semantic security against an adversary that holds all the keys and has the power to decrypt? We show that even in the pessimistic scenario described, citizens can communicate securely and undetectably. In our terminology, this translates to a positive statement: all semantically secure encryption schemes support subliminal communication. Informally, this means that there is a two-party protocol between Alice and Bob where the parties exchange ciphertexts of what appears to be a normal conversation even to someone who knows the secret keys and thus can read the corresponding plaintexts. And yet, at the end of the protocol, Alice will have transmitted her secret message to Bob. Our security definition requires that the adversary not be able to tell whether Alice and Bob are just having a normal conversation using the mandated encryption scheme, or they are using the mandated encryption scheme for subliminal communication. Our topics may be thought to fall broadly within the realm of steganography. However, we deal with the non-standard setting of an adversarially chosen distribution of cover objects (i.e., a stronger-than-usual adversary), and we take advantage of the fact that our cover objects are ciphertexts of a semantically secure encryption scheme to bypass impossibility results which we show for broader classes of steganographic schemes. We give several constructions of subliminal communication schemes under the assumption that key exchange protocols with pseudorandom messages exist (such as Diffie-Hellman, which in fact has truly random messages).
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2024-09-23T09:36:43Z
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Article
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mit-1721.1/137343
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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English
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2024-09-23T09:36:43Z
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2021
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dspace
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mit-1721.1/1373432022-04-01T17:27:47Z How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts © Thibaut Horel, Sunoo Park, Silas Richelson, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. In this work, we examine the feasibility of secure and undetectable point-to-point communication when an adversary (e.g., a government) can read all encrypted communications of surveillance targets. We consider a model where the only permitted method of communication is via a government-mandated encryption scheme, instantiated with government-mandated keys. Parties cannot simply encrypt ciphertexts of some other encryption scheme, because citizens caught trying to communicate outside the government’s knowledge (e.g., by encrypting strings which do not appear to be natural language plaintexts) will be arrested. The one guarantee we suppose is that the government mandates an encryption scheme which is semantically secure against outsiders: a perhaps reasonable supposition when a government might consider it advantageous to secure its people’s communication against foreign entities. But then, what good is semantic security against an adversary that holds all the keys and has the power to decrypt? We show that even in the pessimistic scenario described, citizens can communicate securely and undetectably. In our terminology, this translates to a positive statement: all semantically secure encryption schemes support subliminal communication. Informally, this means that there is a two-party protocol between Alice and Bob where the parties exchange ciphertexts of what appears to be a normal conversation even to someone who knows the secret keys and thus can read the corresponding plaintexts. And yet, at the end of the protocol, Alice will have transmitted her secret message to Bob. Our security definition requires that the adversary not be able to tell whether Alice and Bob are just having a normal conversation using the mandated encryption scheme, or they are using the mandated encryption scheme for subliminal communication. Our topics may be thought to fall broadly within the realm of steganography. However, we deal with the non-standard setting of an adversarially chosen distribution of cover objects (i.e., a stronger-than-usual adversary), and we take advantage of the fact that our cover objects are ciphertexts of a semantically secure encryption scheme to bypass impossibility results which we show for broader classes of steganographic schemes. We give several constructions of subliminal communication schemes under the assumption that key exchange protocols with pseudorandom messages exist (such as Diffie-Hellman, which in fact has truly random messages). 2021-11-04T15:13:48Z 2021-11-04T15:13:48Z 2019-01 2021-03-26T16:37:33Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137343 2019. "How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts." Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs, 124. en 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.42 Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ application/pdf DROPS
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| spellingShingle |
How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts
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| title |
How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts
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| title_full |
How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts
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| title_fullStr |
How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts
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| title_full_unstemmed |
How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts
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| title_short |
How to subvert backdoored encryption: Security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts
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| title_sort |
how to subvert backdoored encryption security against adversaries that decrypt all ciphertexts
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| url |
https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137343
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