Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations
© 2018 IEEE. Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are increasingly supporting highway operations such as electronic toll collection, carpooling, and vehicle platooning. In this paper we study the incentives of strategic misbehavior by individual vehicles who can exploit the security vulner...
| 主要な著者: | , , , |
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| その他の著者: | |
| フォーマット: | 論文 |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
IEEE
2021
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| オンライン･アクセス: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137676 |
| _version_ | 1826209612290850816 |
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| author | Wu, Manxi Jin, Li Amin, Saurabh Jaillet, Patrick |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society Wu, Manxi Jin, Li Amin, Saurabh Jaillet, Patrick |
| author_sort | Wu, Manxi |
| collection | MIT |
| description | © 2018 IEEE. Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are increasingly supporting highway operations such as electronic toll collection, carpooling, and vehicle platooning. In this paper we study the incentives of strategic misbehavior by individual vehicles who can exploit the security vulnerabilities in V2I communications and negatively impact the highway operations. We consider a V2I-enabled highway segment facing two classes of vehicles (agent populations), each with an authorized access to one server (subset of lanes). Vehicles are strategic in that they can misreport their class (type) to the system operator and get an unauthorized access to the server dedicated to the other class. This misbehavior causes additional congestion externality on the compliant vehicles, and thus, needs to be deterred. We focus on an environment where the operator is able to inspect the vehicles for misbehavior. The inspection is costly and successful detection incurs a fine on the misbehaving vehicle. We formulate a signaling game to study the strategic interaction between the vehicle classes and the operator. Our equilibrium analysis provides conditions on the cost parameters that govern the vehicles' incentive to misbehave or not. We also determine the operator's equilibrium inspection strategy. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:25:13Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/137676 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:25:13Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | IEEE |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1376762023-02-08T20:35:33Z Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations Wu, Manxi Jin, Li Amin, Saurabh Jaillet, Patrick Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering © 2018 IEEE. Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are increasingly supporting highway operations such as electronic toll collection, carpooling, and vehicle platooning. In this paper we study the incentives of strategic misbehavior by individual vehicles who can exploit the security vulnerabilities in V2I communications and negatively impact the highway operations. We consider a V2I-enabled highway segment facing two classes of vehicles (agent populations), each with an authorized access to one server (subset of lanes). Vehicles are strategic in that they can misreport their class (type) to the system operator and get an unauthorized access to the server dedicated to the other class. This misbehavior causes additional congestion externality on the compliant vehicles, and thus, needs to be deterred. We focus on an environment where the operator is able to inspect the vehicles for misbehavior. The inspection is costly and successful detection incurs a fine on the misbehaving vehicle. We formulate a signaling game to study the strategic interaction between the vehicle classes and the operator. Our equilibrium analysis provides conditions on the cost parameters that govern the vehicles' incentive to misbehave or not. We also determine the operator's equilibrium inspection strategy. 2021-11-08T15:10:25Z 2021-11-08T15:10:25Z 2018-12 2019-05-31T18:42:19Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/ConferencePaper https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137676 Wu, Manxi, Jin, Li, Amin, Saurabh and Jaillet, Patrick. 2018. "Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations." en 10.1109/cdc.2018.8619109 Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf IEEE MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Wu, Manxi Jin, Li Amin, Saurabh Jaillet, Patrick Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations |
| title | Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations |
| title_full | Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations |
| title_fullStr | Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations |
| title_full_unstemmed | Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations |
| title_short | Signaling Game-based Misbehavior Inspection in V2I-enabled Highway Operations |
| title_sort | signaling game based misbehavior inspection in v2i enabled highway operations |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137676 |
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