CaSA: End-to-end quantitative security analysis of randomly mapped caches
© 2020 IEEE. It is well known that there are micro-architectural vulnerabilities that enable an attacker to use caches to exfiltrate secrets from a victim. These vulnerabilities exploit the fact that the attacker can detect cache lines that were accessed by the victim. Therefore, architects have loo...
Main Authors: | Bourgeat, T, Drean, J, Yang, Y, Tsai, L, Emer, J, Yan, M |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
IEEE
2021
|
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/137794 |
Similar Items
-
Casa Covida
by: Rael, Ronald, et al.
Published: (2024) -
The casa: architecture students in residence - Die Casa: Architekturstudierende in residence
by: Denicke-Polcher, Sandra, et al.
Published: (2022) -
Management front end for cache server
by: Chan, Yunn Chyuan
Published: (2010) -
DAGguise: mitigating memory timing side channels
by: Deutsch, Peter W, et al.
Published: (2022) -
Secure end-to-end web-based system for course file storage
by: Herry Lim
Published: (2022)