Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms
<jats:p>Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoret...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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American Economic Association
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138035 |
| _version_ | 1826210897654185984 |
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| author | Agarwal, Nikhil Ashlagi, Itai Somaini, Paulo Waldinger, Daniel |
| author_facet | Agarwal, Nikhil Ashlagi, Itai Somaini, Paulo Waldinger, Daniel |
| author_sort | Agarwal, Nikhil |
| collection | MIT |
| description | <jats:p>Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoretical results to show that the welfare effects of a mechanism depend on the interaction between dynamic incentives and heterogeneity in preferences. We show evidence suggesting that patient decisions on the deceased donor kidney wait list respond to dynamic incentives. Therefore, an empirical approach to dynamic mechanism design is an essential complement to mechanism design theory in dynamic environments.</jats:p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:57:12Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/138035 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:57:12Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1380352021-11-10T03:11:21Z Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms Agarwal, Nikhil Ashlagi, Itai Somaini, Paulo Waldinger, Daniel <jats:p>Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoretical results to show that the welfare effects of a mechanism depend on the interaction between dynamic incentives and heterogeneity in preferences. We show evidence suggesting that patient decisions on the deceased donor kidney wait list respond to dynamic incentives. Therefore, an empirical approach to dynamic mechanism design is an essential complement to mechanism design theory in dynamic environments.</jats:p> 2021-11-09T18:59:31Z 2021-11-09T18:59:31Z 2018-05 2019-10-18T17:15:52Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138035 Agarwal, Nikhil, Ashlagi, Itai, Somaini, Paulo and Waldinger, Daniel. 2018. "Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms." en 10.1257/PANDP.20181079 Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Agarwal, Nikhil Ashlagi, Itai Somaini, Paulo Waldinger, Daniel Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms |
| title | Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms |
| title_full | Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms |
| title_fullStr | Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms |
| title_short | Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms |
| title_sort | dynamic incentives in wait list mechanisms |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138035 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT agarwalnikhil dynamicincentivesinwaitlistmechanisms AT ashlagiitai dynamicincentivesinwaitlistmechanisms AT somainipaulo dynamicincentivesinwaitlistmechanisms AT waldingerdaniel dynamicincentivesinwaitlistmechanisms |