Dynamic Incentives in Wait List Mechanisms
<jats:p>Many scarce public resources are allocated through wait lists that use priorities for individual agents. A new priority system for allocating deceased donor kidneys was adopted in 2014. This redesign was guided by simulations that held decision-rules fixed. We synthesize recent theoret...
Main Authors: | Agarwal, Nikhil, Ashlagi, Itai, Somaini, Paulo, Waldinger, Daniel |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
American Economic Association
2021
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138035 |
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