Scalable Equilibrium Computation in Multi-agent Influence Games on Networks

Scalable Equilibrium Computation in Multi-agent Influence Games on Networks

We provide a polynomial-time, scalable algorithm for equilibrium computation in multi-agent influence games on networks, extending work of Bindel, Kleinberg, and Oren (2015) from the single-agent to the multi-agent setting. In games of influence, agents have limited advertising budget to influence t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Christia, Fotini, Curry, Michael, Daskalakis, Constantinos, Demaine, Erik, Dickerson, John P, Hajiaghayi, MohammadTaghi, Hesterberg, Adam, Knittel, Marina, Milliff, Aidan, Intelligence, Assoc Advancement Artificial
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2021
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138138

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