Building biosecurity for synthetic biology
© 2020 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recom...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
EMBO
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138143 |
| _version_ | 1826214043362263040 |
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| author | Trump, Benjamin D Galaitsi, SE Appleton, Evan Bleijs, Diederik A Florin, Marie-Valentine Gollihar, Jimmy D Hamilton, R Alexander Kuiken, Todd Lentzos, Filippa Mampuys, Ruth Merad, Myriam Novossiolova, Tatyana Oye, Kenneth Perkins, Edward Garcia-Reyero, Natàlia Rhodes, Catherine Linkov, Igor |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science Trump, Benjamin D Galaitsi, SE Appleton, Evan Bleijs, Diederik A Florin, Marie-Valentine Gollihar, Jimmy D Hamilton, R Alexander Kuiken, Todd Lentzos, Filippa Mampuys, Ruth Merad, Myriam Novossiolova, Tatyana Oye, Kenneth Perkins, Edward Garcia-Reyero, Natàlia Rhodes, Catherine Linkov, Igor |
| author_sort | Trump, Benjamin D |
| collection | MIT |
| description | © 2020 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:58:53Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/138143 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:58:53Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | EMBO |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1381432023-02-14T20:13:47Z Building biosecurity for synthetic biology Trump, Benjamin D Galaitsi, SE Appleton, Evan Bleijs, Diederik A Florin, Marie-Valentine Gollihar, Jimmy D Hamilton, R Alexander Kuiken, Todd Lentzos, Filippa Mampuys, Ruth Merad, Myriam Novossiolova, Tatyana Oye, Kenneth Perkins, Edward Garcia-Reyero, Natàlia Rhodes, Catherine Linkov, Igor Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society © 2020 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk. 2021-11-15T18:34:01Z 2021-11-15T18:34:01Z 2020 2021-11-15T18:30:45Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138143 Trump, Benjamin D, Galaitsi, SE, Appleton, Evan, Bleijs, Diederik A, Florin, Marie-Valentine et al. 2020. "Building biosecurity for synthetic biology." Molecular Systems Biology, 16 (7). en 10.15252/MSB.20209723 Molecular Systems Biology Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ application/pdf EMBO EMBO Press |
| spellingShingle | Trump, Benjamin D Galaitsi, SE Appleton, Evan Bleijs, Diederik A Florin, Marie-Valentine Gollihar, Jimmy D Hamilton, R Alexander Kuiken, Todd Lentzos, Filippa Mampuys, Ruth Merad, Myriam Novossiolova, Tatyana Oye, Kenneth Perkins, Edward Garcia-Reyero, Natàlia Rhodes, Catherine Linkov, Igor Building biosecurity for synthetic biology |
| title | Building biosecurity for synthetic biology |
| title_full | Building biosecurity for synthetic biology |
| title_fullStr | Building biosecurity for synthetic biology |
| title_full_unstemmed | Building biosecurity for synthetic biology |
| title_short | Building biosecurity for synthetic biology |
| title_sort | building biosecurity for synthetic biology |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138143 |
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