What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China
How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. T...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
University of Chicago Press
2021
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138156.2 |
| _version_ | 1811077778364170240 |
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| author | Tsai, Lily L. Trinh, Minh D Liu, Shiyao |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science Tsai, Lily L. Trinh, Minh D Liu, Shiyao |
| author_sort | Tsai, Lily L. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evidence to support both mechanisms. Specifically, we find that Chinese citizens positively view local government officials who punish their corrupt subordinates and that this positive view arises out of the perception that these officials are both competent in their jobs and morally committed to citizens’ value. The preference for anticorruption punishment is substantial compared to other sources of public support in authoritarian regimes—economic performance, welfare provision, and institutions for political participation—suggesting that it could become a popular strategy among autocrats. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:48:14Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/138156.2 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:48:14Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | University of Chicago Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/138156.22021-11-24T15:43:13Z What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China Tsai, Lily L. Trinh, Minh D Liu, Shiyao Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Political Science How does punishment of corruption help to build public support in authoritarian regimes? We outline two primary mechanisms. Instrumentally, the ability to pursue anticorruption initiatives to the end signals government capacity. Deontologically, anticorruption punishment signals moral commitments. Through a novel experiment design for mediation analysis embedded in a series of conjoint experiments conducted in China, we find individual-level evidence to support both mechanisms. Specifically, we find that Chinese citizens positively view local government officials who punish their corrupt subordinates and that this positive view arises out of the perception that these officials are both competent in their jobs and morally committed to citizens’ value. The preference for anticorruption punishment is substantial compared to other sources of public support in authoritarian regimes—economic performance, welfare provision, and institutions for political participation—suggesting that it could become a popular strategy among autocrats. 2021-11-24T15:43:12Z 2021-11-18T15:50:32Z 2021-11-24T15:43:12Z 2021 2021-11-18T15:47:28Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138156.2 Tsai, Lily L, Trinh, Minh D and Liu, Shiyao. 2021. "What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China." The Journal of Politics. en 10.1086/715252 The Journal of Politics Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/octet-stream University of Chicago Press University of Chicago Press |
| spellingShingle | Tsai, Lily L. Trinh, Minh D Liu, Shiyao What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China |
| title | What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China |
| title_full | What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China |
| title_fullStr | What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China |
| title_full_unstemmed | What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China |
| title_short | What Makes Anticorruption Punishment Popular? Individual-level Evidence from China |
| title_sort | what makes anticorruption punishment popular individual level evidence from china |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/138156.2 |
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