Selling Information in Competitive Environments
We consider a setting where data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information, about which a data seller owns some payoff relevant information. We formulate the problem facing the seller as a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell, while at the same...
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| Format: | Thesis |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/139898 |
| _version_ | 1826206024448606208 |
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| author | Nouripour, Amir |
| author2 | Dahleh, Munther A. |
| author_facet | Dahleh, Munther A. Nouripour, Amir |
| author_sort | Nouripour, Amir |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We consider a setting where data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information, about which a data seller owns some payoff relevant information. We formulate the problem facing the seller as a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell, while at the same time eliciting the private value types of the buyers and collecting payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of binary games. Our results reveal some important features of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from competition among buyers increase the profitability of selling exclusive information to one of the buyers; (ii) in order for the buyers to follow the seller’s action recommendations, the extent of exclusive sales must be limited; (iii) these same equilibrium constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information distortion that can be introduced by a monopolist data seller; (iv) the fiercer the competition across buyers the stronger the previous two limitations, and the weaker the impact of market power on the equilibrium allocation of information. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:22:48Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/139898 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:22:48Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1398982022-02-08T03:31:33Z Selling Information in Competitive Environments Nouripour, Amir Dahleh, Munther A. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science We consider a setting where data buyers compete in a game of incomplete information, about which a data seller owns some payoff relevant information. We formulate the problem facing the seller as a joint information and mechanism design problem: deciding which information to sell, while at the same time eliciting the private value types of the buyers and collecting payments. We derive the welfare- and revenue-optimal mechanisms for a class of binary games. Our results reveal some important features of selling information in competitive environments: (i) the negative externalities arising from competition among buyers increase the profitability of selling exclusive information to one of the buyers; (ii) in order for the buyers to follow the seller’s action recommendations, the extent of exclusive sales must be limited; (iii) these same equilibrium constraints also limit the distortions in the allocation of information distortion that can be introduced by a monopolist data seller; (iv) the fiercer the competition across buyers the stronger the previous two limitations, and the weaker the impact of market power on the equilibrium allocation of information. S.M. 2022-02-07T15:11:29Z 2022-02-07T15:11:29Z 2021-09 2021-09-21T19:54:13.098Z Thesis https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/139898 In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted Copyright MIT http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-EDU/1.0/ application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Nouripour, Amir Selling Information in Competitive Environments |
| title | Selling Information in Competitive Environments |
| title_full | Selling Information in Competitive Environments |
| title_fullStr | Selling Information in Competitive Environments |
| title_full_unstemmed | Selling Information in Competitive Environments |
| title_short | Selling Information in Competitive Environments |
| title_sort | selling information in competitive environments |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/139898 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nouripouramir sellinginformationincompetitiveenvironments |