Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the “best i...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali
2022
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040032 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141703 |
| _version_ | 1811097733855969280 |
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| author | Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio |
| author_facet | Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio |
| author_sort | Chen, Jing |
| collection | MIT |
| description | In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the “best informed player” would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:04:05Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/141703 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:04:05Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1417032022-04-07T03:01:41Z Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a factor of two, the maximum revenue that the “best informed player” would be sure to obtain if he/she were to sell the goods to his/her opponents via take-it-or-leave-it offers. Our mechanism is probabilistic and of an extensive form. It relies on a new solution concept, for analyzing extensive-form games of incomplete information, which assumes only mutual belief of rationality. Moreover, our mechanism enjoys several novel properties with respect to privacy, computation and collusion. This material is based on work supported by the U.S. Office of Naval Research, Grant No. N00014-09-1-0597. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations therein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research. 2022-04-06T15:10:00Z 2022-04-06T15:10:00Z 2016-10-26 Article https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040032 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141703 Chen, J., & Micali, S. (2016). Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions. Games, 7(4), 32–50. en_US Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ application/pdf MDPI AG/© Jing Chen, & Silvio Micali |
| spellingShingle | Chen, Jing Micali, Silvio Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions |
| title | Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions |
| title_full | Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions |
| title_fullStr | Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions |
| title_short | Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions |
| title_sort | leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions |
| url | https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040032 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141703 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chenjing leveragingpossibilisticbeliefsinunrestrictedcombinatorialauctions AT micalisilvio leveragingpossibilisticbeliefsinunrestrictedcombinatorialauctions |