Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players
We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • W...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141762 |
| Summary: | We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities,
• Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium;
• Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • Works for any number of players n > 1. |
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