Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players
We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • W...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
© Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141762 |
| _version_ | 1826197389918076928 |
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| author | Chen, Jing Hassidim, Avinatan Micali, Silvio |
| author_facet | Chen, Jing Hassidim, Avinatan Micali, Silvio |
| author_sort | Chen, Jing |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities,
• Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium;
• Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • Works for any number of players n > 1. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:46:57Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/141762 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:46:57Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | © Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1417622022-04-08T03:28:31Z Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players Chen, Jing Hassidim, Avinatan Micali, Silvio We put forward a new extensive-form mechanism that, in a general context with perfectly informed players and quasi-linear utilities, • Virtually achieves optimal revenue at a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium; • Is perfectly resilient to the problems of collusion, complexity, and privacy; and • Works for any number of players n > 1. This material is based on work supported by the U.S. Office of Naval Research, Grant No. N00014-09-1-0597. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations therein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of Naval Research. 2022-04-07T18:00:31Z 2022-04-07T18:00:31Z 2010-01-13 Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141762 Chen, J., Hassidim, A., & Micali, S. (2010). Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players (ECIR Working Paper 2010-1). MIT Political Science Department. en_US ECIR Working Paper No. 2010-1 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/us/ application/pdf © Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Chen, Jing Hassidim, Avinatan Micali, Silvio Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players |
| title | Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players |
| title_full | Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players |
| title_fullStr | Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players |
| title_full_unstemmed | Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players |
| title_short | Resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players |
| title_sort | resilient and virtually perfect revenue from perfectly informed players |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/141762 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chenjing resilientandvirtuallyperfectrevenuefromperfectlyinformedplayers AT hassidimavinatan resilientandvirtuallyperfectrevenuefromperfectlyinformedplayers AT micalisilvio resilientandvirtuallyperfectrevenuefromperfectlyinformedplayers |