All-pay auctions as models for military annexation
Abstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource trans...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144067 |
| Summary: | Abstract
We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. |
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