All-pay auctions as models for military annexation
Abstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource trans...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144067 |
| _version_ | 1826196476272836608 |
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| author | Kang, Benjamin Unwin, James |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics Kang, Benjamin Unwin, James |
| author_sort | Kang, Benjamin |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Abstract
We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:27:09Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/144067 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:27:09Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1440672023-06-29T07:37:21Z All-pay auctions as models for military annexation Kang, Benjamin Unwin, James Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Mathematics Abstract We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and military power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. We derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. 2022-07-27T14:57:39Z 2022-07-27T14:57:39Z 2022-05-13 2022-07-27T03:25:47Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144067 Kang, Benjamin and Unwin, James. 2022. "All-pay auctions as models for military annexation." en https://doi.org/10.1007/s12076-022-00306-8 Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature application/pdf Springer Berlin Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| spellingShingle | Kang, Benjamin Unwin, James All-pay auctions as models for military annexation |
| title | All-pay auctions as models for military annexation |
| title_full | All-pay auctions as models for military annexation |
| title_fullStr | All-pay auctions as models for military annexation |
| title_full_unstemmed | All-pay auctions as models for military annexation |
| title_short | All-pay auctions as models for military annexation |
| title_sort | all pay auctions as models for military annexation |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144067 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kangbenjamin allpayauctionsasmodelsformilitaryannexation AT unwinjames allpayauctionsasmodelsformilitaryannexation |