An argument against causal decision theory
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle,...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press (OUP)
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144348 |
| Summary: | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>This paper develops an argument against causal decision theory. I formulate a principle of preference, which I call the Guaranteed Principle. I argue that the preferences of rational agents satisfy the Guaranteed Principle, that the preferences of agents who embody causal decision theory do not, and hence that causal decision theory is false.</jats:p> |
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