Justified Communication Equilibrium
<jats:p> Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than rece...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
American Economic Association
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144468 |
| _version_ | 1826199266296594432 |
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| author | Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew |
| author_sort | Clark, Daniel |
| collection | MIT |
| description | <jats:p> Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games. (JEL C70, D82, D83, J23, M51) </jats:p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:17:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/144468 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:17:21Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | American Economic Association |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1444682023-04-11T20:03:00Z Justified Communication Equilibrium Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics <jats:p> Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games. (JEL C70, D82, D83, J23, M51) </jats:p> 2022-08-26T17:59:40Z 2022-08-26T17:59:40Z 2021 2022-08-26T17:37:22Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144468 Clark, Daniel and Fudenberg, Drew. 2021. "Justified Communication Equilibrium." American Economic Review, 111 (9). en 10.1257/AER.20201692 American Economic Review Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. application/pdf American Economic Association American Economic Association |
| spellingShingle | Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Justified Communication Equilibrium |
| title | Justified Communication Equilibrium |
| title_full | Justified Communication Equilibrium |
| title_fullStr | Justified Communication Equilibrium |
| title_full_unstemmed | Justified Communication Equilibrium |
| title_short | Justified Communication Equilibrium |
| title_sort | justified communication equilibrium |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144468 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT clarkdaniel justifiedcommunicationequilibrium AT fudenbergdrew justifiedcommunicationequilibrium |