Justified Communication Equilibrium
<jats:p> Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than rece...
Main Authors: | Clark, Daniel, Fudenberg, Drew |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
American Economic Association
2022
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144468 |
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