Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching, overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state equilibria exist under general conditions on records...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press (OUP)
2022
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144470 |
| _version_ | 1826200059846328320 |
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| author | Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander |
| author_sort | Clark, Daniel |
| collection | MIT |
| description | <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching, overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state equilibria exist under general conditions on records. When the updating of a player’s record can depend on the actions of both players in a match, any strictly individually rational action can be supported in a steady-state equilibrium. When record updates can depend only on a player’s own actions, fewer actions can be supported. Here, we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma and restrict attention to strict equilibria that are coordination-proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game induced by their records and expected continuation payoffs. Such equilibria can support full cooperation if the stage game is either “strictly supermodular and mild” or “strongly supermodular,” and otherwise permit no cooperation at all. The presence of “supercooperator” records, where a player cooperates against any opponent, is crucial for supporting any cooperation when the stage game is “severe.”</jats:p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:30:23Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/144470 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:30:23Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1444702023-08-07T18:07:39Z Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics <jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>We introduce a new model of repeated games in large populations with random matching, overlapping generations, and limited records of past play. We prove that steady-state equilibria exist under general conditions on records. When the updating of a player’s record can depend on the actions of both players in a match, any strictly individually rational action can be supported in a steady-state equilibrium. When record updates can depend only on a player’s own actions, fewer actions can be supported. Here, we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma and restrict attention to strict equilibria that are coordination-proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game induced by their records and expected continuation payoffs. Such equilibria can support full cooperation if the stage game is either “strictly supermodular and mild” or “strongly supermodular,” and otherwise permit no cooperation at all. The presence of “supercooperator” records, where a player cooperates against any opponent, is crucial for supporting any cooperation when the stage game is “severe.”</jats:p> 2022-08-26T18:23:05Z 2022-08-26T18:23:05Z 2021 2022-08-26T18:11:28Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144470 Clark, Daniel, Fudenberg, Drew and Wolitzky, Alexander. 2021. "Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies." Review of Economic Studies, 88 (5). en 10.1093/RESTUD/RDAB016 Review of Economic Studies Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press (OUP) National Science Foundation Public Access Repository |
| spellingShingle | Clark, Daniel Fudenberg, Drew Wolitzky, Alexander Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
| title | Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
| title_full | Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
| title_fullStr | Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
| title_full_unstemmed | Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
| title_short | Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies |
| title_sort | record keeping and cooperation in large societies |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144470 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT clarkdaniel recordkeepingandcooperationinlargesocieties AT fudenbergdrew recordkeepingandcooperationinlargesocieties AT wolitzkyalexander recordkeepingandcooperationinlargesocieties |