Long Term Policy Goals Under Electoral Competition Given Varied Temporal Discount Rates Among Voters
Many important issues facing the world involve temporal tradeoffs, requiring costly investment in the short term for payoffs that accrue much later. However, politicians facing frequent elections are held accountable to voter preferences, where voters tend to be myopic, making investment difficult....
Main Author: | Nicholas, Sara |
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Other Authors: | Magazinnik, Asya |
Format: | Thesis |
Published: |
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2022
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/144947 |
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