A Few Bad Apples Spoil the Barrel: An Anti-Folk Theorem for Anonymous Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
<jats:p> We study anonymous repeated games where players may be “commitment types” who always take the same action. We establish a stark anti-folk theorem: if the distribution of the number of commitment types satisfies a smoothness condition and the game has a “pairwise dominant” action, this...
| প্রধান লেখক: | , |
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| অন্যান্য লেখক: | |
| বিন্যাস: | প্রবন্ধ |
| ভাষা: | English |
| প্রকাশিত: |
American Economic Association
2022
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| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/145249 |