Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents
Main Authors: | Haghtalab, Nika, Lykouris, Thodoris, Nietert, Sloan, Wei, Alexander |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Sloan School of Management |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
ACM|Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
2022
|
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/146434 |
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