Evidence and truth
Abstract Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It t...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2023
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/148223 |
| _version_ | 1826217447522304000 |
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| author | White, Roger |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy White, Roger |
| author_sort | White, Roger |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Abstract
Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It turns out that Comesaña’s position lends itself to the conclusion that while false evidence is possible and not even terribly uncommon, I can be rationally sure that I don’t currently have any and perhaps also that I won’t get any, and (absent certain evidence to the contrary) you are not afflicted with any either. This conclusion might seem too good to be true. I finish by raising a puzzle about one of the main motivations for Comesaña’s view. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:03:48Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/148223 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:03:48Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Springer Netherlands |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1482232023-03-01T03:01:13Z Evidence and truth White, Roger Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Abstract Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s Being Rational and Being Right makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It turns out that Comesaña’s position lends itself to the conclusion that while false evidence is possible and not even terribly uncommon, I can be rationally sure that I don’t currently have any and perhaps also that I won’t get any, and (absent certain evidence to the contrary) you are not afflicted with any either. This conclusion might seem too good to be true. I finish by raising a puzzle about one of the main motivations for Comesaña’s view. 2023-02-27T14:17:00Z 2023-02-27T14:17:00Z 2023-02-20 2023-02-26T04:14:57Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/148223 White, Roger. 2023. "Evidence and truth." PUBLISHER_CC en https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-01919-5 Creative Commons Attribution https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ The Author(s) application/pdf Springer Netherlands Springer Netherlands |
| spellingShingle | White, Roger Evidence and truth |
| title | Evidence and truth |
| title_full | Evidence and truth |
| title_fullStr | Evidence and truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Evidence and truth |
| title_short | Evidence and truth |
| title_sort | evidence and truth |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/148223 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT whiteroger evidenceandtruth |