Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks
<jats:p> Ensuring the security of critical infrastructures is crucial for the society’s welfare and prosperity. However, these infrastructure networks are inherently vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional threats. In “Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks,” Dahan, Sela,...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)
2023
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/148394 |
| _version_ | 1826205782875570176 |
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| author | Dahan, Mathieu Sela, Lina Amin, Saurabh |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering Dahan, Mathieu Sela, Lina Amin, Saurabh |
| author_sort | Dahan, Mathieu |
| collection | MIT |
| description | <jats:p> Ensuring the security of critical infrastructures is crucial for the society’s welfare and prosperity. However, these infrastructure networks are inherently vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional threats. In “Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks,” Dahan, Sela, and Amin study a strategic network inspection problem, formulated as a large-scale bilevel optimization problem, in which a utility seeks to determine an inspection strategy with minimum number of smart detectors that ensures a desirable expected detection performance under worst-case attacks. The authors derive structural properties of optimal solutions and show that the problem can be solved using Nash equilibria of a large-scale zero-sum game. Their analysis leads to a computationally tractable and operationally feasible solution approach with theoretical guarantees based on combinatorial objects that capture the nature of equilibrium inspection and attack strategies. Their computational study indicates that utilities can achieve a high level of protection in large-scale networks by strategically positioning a small number of detectors. </jats:p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:19:02Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/148394 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:19:02Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1483942023-03-08T03:24:12Z Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks Dahan, Mathieu Sela, Lina Amin, Saurabh Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering <jats:p> Ensuring the security of critical infrastructures is crucial for the society’s welfare and prosperity. However, these infrastructure networks are inherently vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional threats. In “Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks,” Dahan, Sela, and Amin study a strategic network inspection problem, formulated as a large-scale bilevel optimization problem, in which a utility seeks to determine an inspection strategy with minimum number of smart detectors that ensures a desirable expected detection performance under worst-case attacks. The authors derive structural properties of optimal solutions and show that the problem can be solved using Nash equilibria of a large-scale zero-sum game. Their analysis leads to a computationally tractable and operationally feasible solution approach with theoretical guarantees based on combinatorial objects that capture the nature of equilibrium inspection and attack strategies. Their computational study indicates that utilities can achieve a high level of protection in large-scale networks by strategically positioning a small number of detectors. </jats:p> 2023-03-07T16:56:15Z 2023-03-07T16:56:15Z 2022 2023-03-07T16:48:35Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/148394 Dahan, Mathieu, Sela, Lina and Amin, Saurabh. 2022. "Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks." Operations Research, 70 (2). en 10.1287/OPRE.2021.2180 Operations Research Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) arXiv |
| spellingShingle | Dahan, Mathieu Sela, Lina Amin, Saurabh Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks |
| title | Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks |
| title_full | Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks |
| title_fullStr | Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks |
| title_short | Network Inspection for Detecting Strategic Attacks |
| title_sort | network inspection for detecting strategic attacks |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/148394 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dahanmathieu networkinspectionfordetectingstrategicattacks AT selalina networkinspectionfordetectingstrategicattacks AT aminsaurabh networkinspectionfordetectingstrategicattacks |