Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach
In this paper, we first discuss the concept of "Bill-and-Keep" whereby the party that receives a call pays for receiving the call. We explore if this outcome is efficient and consistent with competitive markets. Following the discussion of Bill-and-Keep we offer an explanation of why th...
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Language: | en_US |
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2002
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1488 |
_version_ | 1826202012295888896 |
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author | Gabel, David |
author_facet | Gabel, David |
author_sort | Gabel, David |
collection | MIT |
description | In this paper, we first discuss the concept of "Bill-and-Keep" whereby the party that receives a
call pays for receiving the call. We explore if this outcome is efficient and consistent with
competitive markets. Following the discussion of Bill-and-Keep we offer an explanation of why
the flow of traffic has been imbalanced between incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) and
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). We explain that this outcome is the natural
outcome of the barriers to entry created by the incumbents in their refusal to provide collocation
to internet service providers (ISPs). |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:00:45Z |
id | mit-1721.1/1488 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | en_US |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:00:45Z |
publishDate | 2002 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/14882019-04-12T08:17:23Z Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach Gabel, David Bill and Keep competitive market telecommunications Internet service providers call interconnection payments local exchange carriers In this paper, we first discuss the concept of "Bill-and-Keep" whereby the party that receives a call pays for receiving the call. We explore if this outcome is efficient and consistent with competitive markets. Following the discussion of Bill-and-Keep we offer an explanation of why the flow of traffic has been imbalanced between incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) and competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). We explain that this outcome is the natural outcome of the barriers to entry created by the incumbents in their refusal to provide collocation to internet service providers (ISPs). 2002-07-22T15:49:55Z 2002-07-22T15:49:55Z 2002-07-22T15:49:55Z http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1488 en_US 70599 bytes application/pdf application/pdf |
spellingShingle | Bill and Keep competitive market telecommunications Internet service providers call interconnection payments local exchange carriers Gabel, David Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach |
title | Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach |
title_full | Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach |
title_fullStr | Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach |
title_full_unstemmed | Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach |
title_short | Interconnection Payments in Telecommunications: A Competitive Market Approach |
title_sort | interconnection payments in telecommunications a competitive market approach |
topic | Bill and Keep competitive market telecommunications Internet service providers call interconnection payments local exchange carriers |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1488 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gabeldavid interconnectionpaymentsintelecommunicationsacompetitivemarketapproach |