Representing Change
This paper evaluates knowledge representations for time-dependent information. It compares recent work by Moore, McDermott, and Allen with an ealier proposal by McCarthy and Hayes. Moore's formalism is faulted for its needless and unmotivated complexity and a simpler alternative is outlined. Mc...
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2023
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/149114 |
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author | Sacks, Elisha |
author_facet | Sacks, Elisha |
author_sort | Sacks, Elisha |
collection | MIT |
description | This paper evaluates knowledge representations for time-dependent information. It compares recent work by Moore, McDermott, and Allen with an ealier proposal by McCarthy and Hayes. Moore's formalism is faulted for its needless and unmotivated complexity and a simpler alternative is outlined. McDermott's formalism is proved inconsistent and unintuitive. Allen achieves the most by attempting the least. He proposes a simple plausible formalism, which makes few ontological or computational commitments. The paper concludes with a high-level discussion of the merits formal logic as a representation for empirical knowledge. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:32:50Z |
id | mit-1721.1/149114 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:32:50Z |
publishDate | 2023 |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/1491142023-03-30T03:51:53Z Representing Change Sacks, Elisha This paper evaluates knowledge representations for time-dependent information. It compares recent work by Moore, McDermott, and Allen with an ealier proposal by McCarthy and Hayes. Moore's formalism is faulted for its needless and unmotivated complexity and a simpler alternative is outlined. McDermott's formalism is proved inconsistent and unintuitive. Allen achieves the most by attempting the least. He proposes a simple plausible formalism, which makes few ontological or computational commitments. The paper concludes with a high-level discussion of the merits formal logic as a representation for empirical knowledge. 2023-03-29T14:28:20Z 2023-03-29T14:28:20Z 1986-05 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/149114 17318767 MIT-LCS-TM-305 application/pdf |
spellingShingle | Sacks, Elisha Representing Change |
title | Representing Change |
title_full | Representing Change |
title_fullStr | Representing Change |
title_full_unstemmed | Representing Change |
title_short | Representing Change |
title_sort | representing change |
url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/149114 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT sackselisha representingchange |