Metior: A Comprehensive Model to Evaluate Obfuscating Side-Channel Defense Schemes
Main Authors: | Deutsch, Peter, Na, Weon Taek, Bourgeat, Thomas, Emer, Joel, Yan, Mengjia |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
ACM|Proceedings of the 50th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture
2023
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Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/151102 |
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