Rational Polarization
<jats:p>Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies su...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Duke University Press
2023
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152977 |
| _version_ | 1826208395635458048 |
|---|---|
| author | Dorst, Kevin |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Dorst, Kevin |
| author_sort | Dorst, Kevin |
| collection | MIT |
| description | <jats:p>Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity is necessary and sufficient for the rationality of predictable polarization. The main theoretical result is that there can be a series of such updates, each of which is individually expected to make you more accurate, but which together will predictably polarize you. Polarization results from asymmetric increases in accuracy. This mechanism is not only theoretically possible, but empirically plausible. I argue that cognitive search—searching a cognitively accessible space for a particular item—often yields asymmetrically ambiguous evidence, I present an experiment supporting its polarizing effects, and I use simulations to show how it can explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect.</jats:p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:05:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/152977 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:05:06Z |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publisher | Duke University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1529772024-02-05T20:03:08Z Rational Polarization Dorst, Kevin Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Philosophy <jats:p>Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions, including our own, will shift over time. Extant theories either neglect the fact that we can predict our own polarization, or explain it through irrational mechanisms. They needn’t. Empirical studies suggest that polarization is predictable when evidence is ambiguous, that is, when the rational response is not obvious. I show how Bayesians should model such ambiguity and then prove that—assuming rational updates are those which obey the value of evidence—ambiguity is necessary and sufficient for the rationality of predictable polarization. The main theoretical result is that there can be a series of such updates, each of which is individually expected to make you more accurate, but which together will predictably polarize you. Polarization results from asymmetric increases in accuracy. This mechanism is not only theoretically possible, but empirically plausible. I argue that cognitive search—searching a cognitively accessible space for a particular item—often yields asymmetrically ambiguous evidence, I present an experiment supporting its polarizing effects, and I use simulations to show how it can explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect.</jats:p> 2023-11-15T16:24:54Z 2023-11-15T16:24:54Z 2023-07-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 1558-1470 https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152977 Dorst, Kevin. 2023. "Rational Polarization." The Philosophical Review, 132 (3). 10.1215/00318108-10469499 10.1215/00318108-10469499 The Philosophical Review Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Duke University Press |
| spellingShingle | Philosophy Dorst, Kevin Rational Polarization |
| title | Rational Polarization |
| title_full | Rational Polarization |
| title_fullStr | Rational Polarization |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rational Polarization |
| title_short | Rational Polarization |
| title_sort | rational polarization |
| topic | Philosophy |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/152977 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dorstkevin rationalpolarization |