Organizational Languages
The paper is concerned with communication within a team of players trying to coordinate in response to information dispersed among them. The problem is non-trivial because they cannot communicate all information instantaneously, but hav...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2003
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1812 |
| _version_ | 1811070635450826752 |
|---|---|
| author | Wernerfelt, Birger |
| author_facet | Wernerfelt, Birger |
| author_sort | Wernerfelt, Birger |
| collection | MIT |
| description | The paper is concerned with communication within a team of players trying to
coordinate in response to information dispersed among them. The problem is
non-trivial because they cannot communicate all information instantaneously, but have
to send longer or shorter sequences of messages, using coarse codes. We focus on the
design of these codes and show that members may gain comaptibility advantages by
using identical codes, and that this can support the existence of several, more or less
efficient, symmetric equilibria. Asymmetric eqilibria exist if coordination across
different sets of members is of differing importance, and fewer symmetric equilibria
exist if the members' local environments are sufficiently heterogeneous. The results are
consistent with the stylized fact that firms differ even within industries, and that
coordination between divisions is harder than coordination inside divisions. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:39:11Z |
| format | Working Paper |
| id | mit-1721.1/1812 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:39:11Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/18122019-04-09T19:00:50Z Organizational Languages Wernerfelt, Birger The paper is concerned with communication within a team of players trying to coordinate in response to information dispersed among them. The problem is non-trivial because they cannot communicate all information instantaneously, but have to send longer or shorter sequences of messages, using coarse codes. We focus on the design of these codes and show that members may gain comaptibility advantages by using identical codes, and that this can support the existence of several, more or less efficient, symmetric equilibria. Asymmetric eqilibria exist if coordination across different sets of members is of differing importance, and fewer symmetric equilibria exist if the members' local environments are sufficiently heterogeneous. The results are consistent with the stylized fact that firms differ even within industries, and that coordination between divisions is harder than coordination inside divisions. 2003-02-03T16:48:08Z 2003-02-03T16:48:08Z 2003-02-03T16:48:08Z Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1812 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4278-03 168857 bytes application/pdf application/pdf |
| spellingShingle | Wernerfelt, Birger Organizational Languages |
| title | Organizational Languages |
| title_full | Organizational Languages |
| title_fullStr | Organizational Languages |
| title_full_unstemmed | Organizational Languages |
| title_short | Organizational Languages |
| title_sort | organizational languages |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1812 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT wernerfeltbirger organizationallanguages |