Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement

Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2003.

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
Other Authors: Yosef Sheffi.
Format: Thesis
Language:en_US
Published: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2005
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28578
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author Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
author2 Yosef Sheffi.
author_facet Yosef Sheffi.
Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
author_sort Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
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description Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2003.
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spelling mit-1721.1/285782019-04-11T13:58:28Z Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980- Yosef Sheffi. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division. Engineering Systems Division. Thesis (M. Eng. in Logistics)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Engineering Systems Division, 2003. "June 2003." Includes bibliographical references (p. 62-63). This thesis explores how truckload carriers use conditional bids within the framework of a combinatorial auction to win more business and balance their existing networks. Because a considerable portion of a truckload carrier's cost of serving a given lane is associated with the probability of finding a follow-on load (i.e. economies of scope), bidding on a lane-by-lane basis may not accurately reflect a carrier's true cost of serving that lane. In a combinatorial auction, a truckload carrier can more accurately reflect its true cost of serving a given lane by offering package discounts, conditional on winning lanes that increase the probability of finding follow-on loads. Though a considerable amount has been written about the economics of truckload carrier's operations and the benefits of combinatorial auctions to shippers, few have studied conditional bidding from a bidder's (carrier's) perspective. This thesis makes three contributions. First, an explanation of why bidders do and don't submit conditional bids in combinatorial auctions is provided. Second, a model of carrier costs functions, including package discounts (a measure of economies of scope) is developed. Finally, this thesis examines regional pricing differences, and quantifies the amount by which carriers will change their prices in different regions of the US. by Clinton Lee Plummer. M.Eng.in Logistics 2005-09-27T17:07:44Z 2005-09-27T17:07:44Z 2003 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28578 57468366 en_US M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 81 p. 4537523 bytes 4546633 bytes application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Engineering Systems Division.
Plummer Clinton Lee, 1980-
Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
title Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
title_full Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
title_fullStr Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
title_full_unstemmed Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
title_short Bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
title_sort bidder response to combinatorial auctions in truckload procurement
topic Engineering Systems Division.
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28578
work_keys_str_mv AT plummerclintonlee1980 bidderresponsetocombinatorialauctionsintruckloadprocurement