Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2004.

Manylion Llyfryddiaeth
Prif Awdur: Rauh, Joshua David, 1974-
Awduron Eraill: James M. Poterba.
Fformat: Traethawd Ymchwil
Iaith:eng
Cyhoeddwyd: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2005
Pynciau:
Mynediad Ar-lein:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29426
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author Rauh, Joshua David, 1974-
author2 James M. Poterba.
author_facet James M. Poterba.
Rauh, Joshua David, 1974-
author_sort Rauh, Joshua David, 1974-
collection MIT
description Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2004.
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spelling mit-1721.1/294262019-04-10T22:02:39Z Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy Rauh, Joshua David, 1974- James M. Poterba. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. Economics. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2004. Includes bibliographical references. This dissertation consists of three papers that explore the links between corporate finance and corporate pension policy. The first chapter exploits the funding rules for defined benefit pension plans in order to identify the dependence of corporate investment on internal financial resources. Capital expenditures decline with mandatory pension contributions, even when allowing for very generalized correlations between the pension funding status itself and the firm's unobserved investment opportunities. The effect is particularly evident among firms that appear to face financing constraints based on observable variables such as credit ratings. There is some evidence suggesting that firms which do not sponsor defined benefit pension plans may undertake some of the capital investment that pension sponsors in their industry are unable to take up when required contributions are high. The second chapter tests a corporate control hypothesis to explain why managers might encourage employees to hold company stock in their 401(k) plans. Since employees often vote for incumbent managers in proxy contests, managers may encourage them to hold stock as a defense against a change in corporate control. When a state's laws change to provide more takeover protection for managers, employee ownership of firms incorporated in that state would be expected to decline relative to employee ownership at other firms. I find that the validation of the poison pill through Delaware case law in the mid 1990s had a statistically significant negative effect on employee ownership shares of up to 1.7 percentage points. (cont.) The third chapter, co-authored with Daniel Bergstresser and Mihir Desai, analyzes variation in firms' assumed long-term rates of return on pension assets. We show that this is a lever that can affect reported earnings and provide evidence that managers use this mechanism opportunistically. The sensitivity of reported earnings to the pension return assumption is an important determinant of the assumption itself. Managers increase assumed rates of return as they prepare to acquire other firms and as to exercise stock options. Decisions about assumed rates of return, in turn, influence asset allocation within pension plans. by Joshua David Rauh. Ph.D. 2005-10-14T20:29:13Z 2005-10-14T20:29:13Z 2004 2004 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29426 56140542 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 154 p. 7072829 bytes 7072635 bytes application/pdf application/pdf application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology
spellingShingle Economics.
Rauh, Joshua David, 1974-
Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy
title Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy
title_full Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy
title_fullStr Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy
title_full_unstemmed Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy
title_short Pensions, corporate finance, and public policy
title_sort pensions corporate finance and public policy
topic Economics.
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29426
work_keys_str_mv AT rauhjoshuadavid1974 pensionscorporatefinanceandpublicpolicy