A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms

This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by multiproduct monopolies. The constraint given is simple. It limits information requirements on the regulatory agency to bookkeeping data of the firm. Its implementation could be easily controlled by outs...

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Main Authors: Vogelsang, Ingo, Finsinger, Jörg
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: MIT Energy Laboratory 2006
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/31315
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author Vogelsang, Ingo
Finsinger, Jörg
author_facet Vogelsang, Ingo
Finsinger, Jörg
author_sort Vogelsang, Ingo
collection MIT
description This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by multiproduct monopolies. The constraint given is simple. It limits information requirements on the regulatory agency to bookkeeping data of the firm. Its implementation could be easily controlled by outside courts or auditors. The process, therefore, makes use of invisible hand properties shifting the workload of welfare optimization from the regulatory agency to the regulated firm. This may lead to the ironical conclusion that regulatory commissions should fire their economists. It, however, becomes both profitable and socially beneficial for the regulated firms to employ them. *University of Bonn and M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass.; University of Bonn and International Institute of Management, Berlin, respectively. We owe thanks to various readers of a previous version. Truman Bewley, Peter Diamond, Jonathan Goodman, Ray Hartman, Martin Hellwig, Roger Sherman, Christian von Weizs'acker and an anonymous referee will find that their suggestions have left traces in this paper.
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spelling mit-1721.1/313152019-04-12T07:24:34Z A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms Vogelsang, Ingo Finsinger, Jörg Price regulation This paper describes an incentive mechanism that is shown to enforce the use of Ramsey prices by multiproduct monopolies. The constraint given is simple. It limits information requirements on the regulatory agency to bookkeeping data of the firm. Its implementation could be easily controlled by outside courts or auditors. The process, therefore, makes use of invisible hand properties shifting the workload of welfare optimization from the regulatory agency to the regulated firm. This may lead to the ironical conclusion that regulatory commissions should fire their economists. It, however, becomes both profitable and socially beneficial for the regulated firms to employ them. *University of Bonn and M.I.T. Energy Laboratory, Cambridge, Mass.; University of Bonn and International Institute of Management, Berlin, respectively. We owe thanks to various readers of a previous version. Truman Bewley, Peter Diamond, Jonathan Goodman, Ray Hartman, Martin Hellwig, Roger Sherman, Christian von Weizs'acker and an anonymous referee will find that their suggestions have left traces in this paper. 2006-03-13T15:56:28Z 2006-03-13T15:56:28Z 1978-08 Working Paper 04847588 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/31315 en_US MIT-EL 78-020WP 1164098 bytes application/pdf application/pdf MIT Energy Laboratory
spellingShingle Price regulation
Vogelsang, Ingo
Finsinger, Jörg
A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms
title A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms
title_full A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms
title_fullStr A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms
title_full_unstemmed A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms
title_short A regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms
title_sort regulatory adjustment process for optimal pricing by multiproduct monopoly firms
topic Price regulation
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/31315
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