Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices

This paper explores whether firms that share common directors also pursue similar corporate policies. Using a sample of 885 U.S. firms with common directors, we find that director fixed effects strongly explain variation in firms'...

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Main Authors: Richardson, Scott, Tuna, A. Irem, Wysocki, Peter D.
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: 2003
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3515
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author Richardson, Scott
Tuna, A. Irem
Wysocki, Peter D.
author_facet Richardson, Scott
Tuna, A. Irem
Wysocki, Peter D.
author_sort Richardson, Scott
collection MIT
description This paper explores whether firms that share common directors also pursue similar corporate policies. Using a sample of 885 U.S. firms with common directors, we find that director fixed effects strongly explain variation in firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policy choices. Moreover, the director fixed effects provide incremental explanatory power over traditional economic determinants of firms' policies. consistent with our hypotheses, the director effects are less pronounced in large firms, in firms with more outside board members, and for directors with numerous outside board appointments. Our evidence is more consistent with directors and firms "matching" their policy preferences rather than directors "imposing" their policy preferences on firms
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spelling mit-1721.1/35152019-04-10T23:47:30Z Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices Richardson, Scott Tuna, A. Irem Wysocki, Peter D. Board of Directors Corporate Governance Corporate Policies Disclosure This paper explores whether firms that share common directors also pursue similar corporate policies. Using a sample of 885 U.S. firms with common directors, we find that director fixed effects strongly explain variation in firms' governance, financial, disclosure, and strategic policy choices. Moreover, the director fixed effects provide incremental explanatory power over traditional economic determinants of firms' policies. consistent with our hypotheses, the director effects are less pronounced in large firms, in firms with more outside board members, and for directors with numerous outside board appointments. Our evidence is more consistent with directors and firms "matching" their policy preferences rather than directors "imposing" their policy preferences on firms 2003-05-23T19:36:44Z 2003-05-23T19:36:44Z 2003-05-23T19:36:44Z Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3515 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4307-03 266604 bytes application/pdf application/pdf
spellingShingle Board of Directors
Corporate Governance
Corporate Policies
Disclosure
Richardson, Scott
Tuna, A. Irem
Wysocki, Peter D.
Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices
title Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices
title_full Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices
title_fullStr Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices
title_full_unstemmed Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices
title_short Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices
title_sort accounting for taste board member preferences and corporate policy choices
topic Board of Directors
Corporate Governance
Corporate Policies
Disclosure
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3515
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