Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test
Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Website. (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/)
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| Language: | eng |
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MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
2003
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| Online Access: | http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a91 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3553 |
| _version_ | 1811085240868798464 |
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| author2 | Carlén, Björn. |
| author_facet | Carlén, Björn. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Website. (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/) |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:05:49Z |
| id | mit-1721.1/3553 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T13:05:49Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/35532019-04-12T08:09:58Z Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test Carlén, Björn. QC981.8.C5.M58 no.91 Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change Website. (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/) Includes bibliographical references (p. 18-19). The experiment reported here tests the case of so-called exclusionary manipulation of emission permit markets, i.e., when a dominant firm -- here a monopolist -- increases its holding of permits in order to raise its rivals' costs and thereby gain more on a product market. Earlier studies have claimed that this type of market manipulation is likely to substantially reduce the social gains of permit trading and even result in negative gains. The experiment designed here parallels institutional and informat ional conditions likely to hold in real trade with carbon permits among electricity producers. Although the dominant firm withheld supply from the electricity market, the outcome seems to reject the theory of exclusionary manipulation. In later trading p eriods, closing prices on both markets, permit holdings and total electricity production are near competitive levels. Social gains of emissions trading are higher than in earlier studies. 2003-10-24T14:55:35Z 2003-10-24T14:55:35Z 2002-11 no. 91 http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a91 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3553 eng Report no. 91 http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a91 31 p. 663803 bytes application/pdf application/pdf MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change |
| spellingShingle | QC981.8.C5.M58 no.91 Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test |
| title | Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test |
| title_full | Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test |
| title_fullStr | Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test |
| title_full_unstemmed | Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test |
| title_short | Exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets: a laboratory test |
| title_sort | exclusionary manipulation of carbon permit markets a laboratory test |
| topic | QC981.8.C5.M58 no.91 |
| url | http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a91 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3553 |