Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony?
Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/)
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| Language: | eng |
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MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
2003
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| Online Access: | http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a59 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3587 |
| _version_ | 1826209879159734272 |
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| author2 | Ellerman, A. Denny. |
| author_facet | Ellerman, A. Denny. |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/) |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:33:45Z |
| id | mit-1721.1/3587 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T14:33:45Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publisher | MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/35872019-04-12T14:50:44Z Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? Invitation to monopsony? Ellerman, A. Denny. Sue Wing, Ian. QC981.8.C5.M58 no.59 Abstract in HTML and technical report in PDF available on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change website (http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/) Includes bibliographical references (p. 16). Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol allows Annex B parties to meet their commitments by trading greenhouse gas emissions reductions "supplemental" to domestic emissions control. We demonstrate that implementing supplementarity by imposing concrete ceilings on imports of allowances in a market for tradable emissions rights gives rise to monopsonistic effects, even with price-taking behavior by both buyers and sellers. We assess the importance of this finding for Annex B emissions trading, in the context of the import and export provisions of the recent EU Proposal on supplementarity. Our results show that the proposal would reduce efficiency, and could significantly alter the distribution of the gains from trade in an Annex B tradable permits market. 2003-10-24T14:56:29Z 2003-10-24T14:56:29Z 2000-04 no. 59 http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a59 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3587 eng Report no. 59 21 p. 1386247 bytes application/pdf application/pdf MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change |
| spellingShingle | QC981.8.C5.M58 no.59 Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? |
| title | Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? |
| title_full | Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? |
| title_fullStr | Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? |
| title_short | Supplementarity : an invitation to monopsony? |
| title_sort | supplementarity an invitation to monopsony |
| topic | QC981.8.C5.M58 no.59 |
| url | http://mit.edu/globalchange/www/abstracts.html#a59 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/3587 |