Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes
Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005.
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2007
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/36759 |
| _version_ | 1826201245494280192 |
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| author | Forsythe, Joy Marie |
| author2 | Ronald L. Rivest. |
| author_facet | Ronald L. Rivest. Forsythe, Joy Marie |
| author_sort | Forsythe, Joy Marie |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:48:34Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/36759 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:48:34Z |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/367592019-04-12T15:59:17Z Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes Forsythe, Joy Marie Ronald L. Rivest. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2005. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-64). Voters are now demanding the ability to verify that their votes are cast and counted as intended. Most existing cryptographic election protocols do not treat the voter as a computationally-limited entity separate from the voting booth, and therefore do not ensure that the voting booth records the correct vote. David Chaum and Andrew Neff have proposed mixnet schemes that do provide this assurance, but little research has been done that combines voter verification with homomorphic encryption. This thesis proposes adding voter verification to an existing multi-candidate election scheme (Baudron et al.) that uses Paillier encryption. A "cut and choose" protocol provides a probabilistic guarantee of correctness. The scheme is straightforward, and could easily be extended to multi-authority elections. The feasibility of the proposed scheme is demonstrated via a simple implementation. by Joy Marie Forsythe. M.Eng. 2007-03-12T17:51:08Z 2007-03-12T17:51:08Z 2005 2005 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/36759 78617481 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 64 leaves application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Forsythe, Joy Marie Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes |
| title | Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes |
| title_full | Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes |
| title_fullStr | Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes |
| title_full_unstemmed | Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes |
| title_short | Voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes |
| title_sort | voter verifiability in homomorphic election schemes |
| topic | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/36759 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT forsythejoymarie voterverifiabilityinhomomorphicelectionschemes |