Essays on informal banking
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2007
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37415 |
| _version_ | 1826191095247142912 |
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| author | Basu, Karna |
| author2 | Abhijit Banerjee and Xavier Gabaix. |
| author_facet | Abhijit Banerjee and Xavier Gabaix. Basu, Karna |
| author_sort | Basu, Karna |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:50:29Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/37415 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T08:50:29Z |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/374152019-04-10T13:45:52Z Essays on informal banking Basu, Karna Abhijit Banerjee and Xavier Gabaix. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. Economics. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006. "September 2006." Includes bibliographical references. This thesis is a collection of three theoretical essays that examine the role of time-inconsistent preferences in informal banking. The first two chapters focus on specific banking institutions, while the third studies individual welfare more generally. In Chapter 1, I develop a model of rotating savings and credit associations (roscas) where members are quasi-hyperbolic discounters. I show that, in this setting, roscas function as commitment savings devices, and can survive in equilibrium even in the absence of formal contracting or informal social sanctions. In Chapter 2, I study the behavior of quasi-hyperbolic discounters who have access to credit and a non-secure savings technology. I show that these agents might simultaneously save and borrow to create optimal investment incentives for future selves. Chapter 3 evaluates and compares the welfare outcomes for time-inconsistent agents under several banking environments. by Karna Basu. Ph.D. 2007-05-16T18:33:26Z 2007-05-16T18:33:26Z 2006 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37415 123030513 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 94 p. application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Economics. Basu, Karna Essays on informal banking |
| title | Essays on informal banking |
| title_full | Essays on informal banking |
| title_fullStr | Essays on informal banking |
| title_full_unstemmed | Essays on informal banking |
| title_short | Essays on informal banking |
| title_sort | essays on informal banking |
| topic | Economics. |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37415 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT basukarna essaysoninformalbanking |