Perfect Implementation of Normal-Form Mechanisms
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet they have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism ---by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator--- may not be re...
Main Authors: | Izmalkov, Sergei, Lepinski, Matt, Micali, Silvio |
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Outros Autores: | Silvio Micali |
Publicado em: |
2007
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Assuntos: | |
Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/38208 |
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