Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation

Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions. These two approaches are usually labeled as "make" and "buy" strategies. In this paper, I examine the relation between a firm's choice of "make" or "buy" and the performa...

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Main Author: Xue, Yanfeng
Format: Working Paper
Language:en_US
Published: 2004
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4049
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author Xue, Yanfeng
author_facet Xue, Yanfeng
author_sort Xue, Yanfeng
collection MIT
description Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions. These two approaches are usually labeled as "make" and "buy" strategies. In this paper, I examine the relation between a firm's choice of "make" or "buy" and the performance measures used in the firm's CEO compensation contract. I focus on the two major differences between "make" and "buy" strategies: the risk levels and accounting treatments. I then examine the differential implications of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures on managers' incentive in choosing between the two strategies. Using data from US high tech industries, I find that, firms relying on "buy" approach to obtain technology tend to depend more on the accounting-based performance measures, while those firms who innovate through R&D activities skew toward stock-based pay especially stock options
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spelling mit-1721.1/40492019-04-09T18:24:41Z Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation Xue, Yanfeng R&D Acquisition Compensation Technology Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions. These two approaches are usually labeled as "make" and "buy" strategies. In this paper, I examine the relation between a firm's choice of "make" or "buy" and the performance measures used in the firm's CEO compensation contract. I focus on the two major differences between "make" and "buy" strategies: the risk levels and accounting treatments. I then examine the differential implications of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures on managers' incentive in choosing between the two strategies. Using data from US high tech industries, I find that, firms relying on "buy" approach to obtain technology tend to depend more on the accounting-based performance measures, while those firms who innovate through R&D activities skew toward stock-based pay especially stock options 2004-02-13T19:27:21Z 2004-02-13T19:27:21Z 2004-02-13T19:27:21Z Working Paper http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4049 en_US MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper;4436-03 194036 bytes application/pdf application/pdf
spellingShingle R&D
Acquisition
Compensation
Technology
Xue, Yanfeng
Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation
title Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation
title_full Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation
title_fullStr Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation
title_full_unstemmed Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation
title_short Make or Buy New Technology – a CEO Compensation Contract’s Role in a Firm’s Route to Innovation
title_sort make or buy new technology a ceo compensation contract s role in a firm s route to innovation
topic R&D
Acquisition
Compensation
Technology
url http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/4049
work_keys_str_mv AT xueyanfeng makeorbuynewtechnologyaceocompensationcontractsroleinafirmsroutetoinnovation