The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2007.
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Format: | Thesis |
Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2008
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/40952 |
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author | Ramanna, Karthik |
author2 | Ross L. Watts. |
author_facet | Ross L. Watts. Ramanna, Karthik |
author_sort | Ramanna, Karthik |
collection | MIT |
description | Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2007. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:58:32Z |
format | Thesis |
id | mit-1721.1/40952 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | eng |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:58:32Z |
publishDate | 2008 |
publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/409522022-01-13T07:54:52Z The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting Ramanna, Karthik Ross L. Watts. Sloan School of Management. Sloan School of Management Sloan School of Management. Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-55). I study the evolution of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) # 142, which uses unverifiable fair-value estimates to account for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issuing SFAS 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting: pro-pooling firms can be linked-via political contributions-to U.S. Congresspersons pressuring the FASB on this issue. This result is interesting given the proposal to abolish pooling was due in part to the Securities and Exchange Commission's concerns over pooling misuse. I also find evidence consistent with lobbying support for SFAS 142 increasing in firms' discretion under the standard. Agency theory predicts this unverifiable discretion will be used opportunistically. The results highlight the potential costs of unverifiable fair-value accounting. by Karthik Ramanna. Ph.D. 2008-03-27T18:27:23Z 2008-03-27T18:27:23Z 2007 2007 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/40952 212628191 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 80 leaves application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
spellingShingle | Sloan School of Management. Ramanna, Karthik The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting |
title | The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting |
title_full | The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting |
title_fullStr | The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting |
title_full_unstemmed | The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting |
title_short | The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting |
title_sort | implications of unverifiable fair value accounting evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting |
topic | Sloan School of Management. |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/40952 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ramannakarthik theimplicationsofunverifiablefairvalueaccountingevidencefromthepoliticaleconomyofgoodwillaccounting AT ramannakarthik implicationsofunverifiablefairvalueaccountingevidencefromthepoliticaleconomyofgoodwillaccounting |